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This thesis is a case study into the development of a unique prototyping concept 
to support aviation and missile weapon system requirements.  The U.S. Army Aviation 
and Missile Command has an electrical and mechanical prototyping capability that has 
existed for twenty-five years, but has been geographically and functionally separated.  
These capabilities have been integrated both functionally and geographically, into the 
Prototype Integration Facility, Building 5405, at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.  Aviation 
and missile program managers are faced with the increased challenge to acquire materiel 
in a in a more cost effective, timely manner.  The Prototype Integration Facility (PIF) 
concept builds off the foundation of the existing base of prototyping experience, but 
integrates unique business principles to form a creative, powerful concept to assist 
aviation and missile program managers in their quest to rapidly provide materiel to the 
warfighter.  The primary tenants of the PIF concept include the leveraging of existing 
Governmental and industrial capabilities to provide a cost effective alternative for 
program managers to utilize.  The PIF concept utilizes a ten-year, $1.1 billion contract, to 
leverage the capabilities of original equipment manufacturers, capability-specific 
companies and small businesses.  Since implementation of the PIF concept in June 2002, 
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This research will analyze the methodologies and philosophies utilized by 
Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC), U.S. 
Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) personnel to develop a unique 
prototyping strategy to better support aviation and missile weapon system requirements. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Weapon system program managers are continually facing the challenges 
associated with the execution of rapid development of their weapon systems within 
program budgets that, at best, remain fixed, but that in most cases are actually reduced.  
This challenge, compounded with the transformation of the Army to a lighter, more 
flexible, and more rapidly deployed force, created the need to examine potential 
alternatives to the more traditional means of materiel development.  In 2001, the 
AMCOM AMRDEC initiated efforts to craft a prototyping strategy that would aid both 
weapon system program managers and the Army in their quest.  This research will depict 
how the AMRDEC prototyping strategy is assisting weapons system program managers 
in providing the opportunity to deploy materiel to soldiers both quicker and at a more 
efficient cost. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this thesis is: 
• What are the primary tenants of the unique prototyping strategy developed 
at AMCOM and what benefits will it provide to aviation and missile 
weapon systems? 
The following are subsidiary research questions to help develop and define the 
primary research question: 
• What business and capability impacts does the AMRDEC prototyping 
strategy have on the AMRDEC as a whole? 
• What impact does the AMRDEC prototyping strategy have on other 
AMCOM and AMCOM tenant organizations? 
• What is the relationship that exists with industry as a result of 
implementation of the AMRDEC prototyping strategy? 
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• What cultural barriers were encountered during the implementation of the 
AMRDEC prototyping strategy and how were they overcome? 
• How does the AMRDEC prototyping strategy fit within the new Research, 
Development and Engineering Command within the Army Materiel 
Command? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The scope of the thesis will include 1) the independent description of the 
prototyping efforts that existed at AMCOM prior to the development of the current 
strategy; 2) the influences on the weapon system program managers that formed the basis 
for the need of the AMRDEC prototyping strategy; 3) the major tenants, challenges, and 
benefits to date of the AMRDEC prototyping strategy; and 4) the potential for application 
of the AMRDEC prototyping strategy as a model  in other Army organizations. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Data was gathered through personal interviews with AMCOM and Program 
Executive Office (PEO) personnel involved in the development of the AMRDEC 
prototyping strategy.  A comprehensive analysis of the information gathered with respect 
to the AMRDEC prototyping strategy and its impact to missile and aviation program 
managers was performed.  A synthesis analysis was performed with business and 
readiness considerations to depict the results to date of the implementation of the 
AMCOM prototyping strategy and offered recommendations for potential improvements. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II depicts the AMRDEC prototyping strategy that existed previous to the 
current strategy. 
Chapter III identifies the influences and challenges faced by program managers 
that lead to the development of the AMRDEC prototyping strategy. 
Chapter IV provides a description of the major tenants, challenges, and benefits to 
date of the AMRDEC prototyping strategy, including those for facilities, contracts, 
personnel, organizational structure, and culture. 
Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations and highlights other areas 
for further research. 
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G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The proposed thesis will provide weapon system program managers with a model 
of how to utilize a unique prototyping strategy as a more cost-effective alternative for the 
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II. AMCOM PROTOTYPING STRATEGY PRIOR TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTOTYPE INTEGRATION 
FACILITY CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to depict the AMCOM prototyping strategy that 
existed prior to the development of the current Prototype Integration Facility (PIF) 
strategy.  It will serve to establish the foundation for how the PIF concept emerged from 
an extensive base of prototyping experience. 
B. HISTORY 
The AMCOM prototyping capability was based in large part upon two 
capabilities that are segregated between two divisions within the Engineering Directorate 
of the AMCOM AMRDEC.  The capabilities are divided between mechanical and 
electrical fabrication and assembly.  The Prototype Engineering Division (Skunk Works) 
has in the past provided the DOD community with mechanical prototyping capabilities, 
while the Manufacturing, Science, and Technology Division’s, Engineering Analysis 
Prototype Lab (EAP Lab) provided the DOD electrical prototyping capabilities.  The 
Engineering Directorate organizational structure depicting the Prototype Engineering 
Division and the Manufacturing, Science, and Technology Division is shown at Figure 1.  
The Prototype Engineering Division was established in the mid 1970s and has 
since provided mechanical fabrication and integration support to missile system project 
offices.  Mechanical capabilities offered by the Prototype Engineering Division included 
milling, joining, cutting and conventional machining.  Originally, the Prototype 
Engineering Division was comprised of ten to fifteen Government personnel and was 
housed in a 30,000 square foot facility built in the 1950’s.  With rapidly increasing 
workloads in the mid 1980s, it became necessary to outsource through the award of Time 
and Materials (T&M) contracts to support the demand for fabrication work.  During the 
next 12 years, additional follow-on T&M contracts of the same type were awarded due, 
in large part, to the downsizing of the Government workforce.  The funding ceilings for 
these contracts did not exceed $5 million.  The Prototype Engineering Division’s primary 
customers were the PATRIOT and Multiple Launch Rocket System Project Offices.  In 
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addition, the Prototype Engineering Division fabricated test fixtures to support live fire 



























































Figure 1.   Engineering Directorate Organizational Chart. 
 
The EAP Lab was established in the early 1970s to provide electrical fabrication 
and assembly support to the missile system project offices.  Engineering, Analysis and 
Prototyping Lab capabilities included design and reverse engineering for electronic 
circuit cards, cables, and wiring harnesses.  The EAP Lab was comprised of six to eight 
Government personnel and was housed in various locations throughout the AMRDEC’s 
building 5400.   
The EAP Lab also was severely affected by attrition in the late 1980s, to the point 
that outsourced contract support was required.  In 1990, a T&M contract was awarded 
with a ceiling of $3 million and duration of 5 years.  By this time, the Electronics Lab’s 
customers and funding continued to increase approximately 25% percent each year, 
leading to new business strategies and additional contract awards.  By mid 2001, the EAP 
Lab’s continued growth, caused by increased customer business, forced the fabrication 
and engineering contracts to reach their ceiling limits prematurely.  Through EAP Lab 
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management efforts to set new goals, priorities, and business strategies for the Electronics 
lab, the fabrication and engineering functions were combined and announced for a 
competitive, 8(a) solicitation for those increased contract ceiling requirements.  In 
January 2001, a $23M contract was awarded to support the EAP Lab. 
The Prototype Engineering Division and the EAP Lab operated as autonomous 
organizations throughout their existence with little desire or motivation to integrate their 
capabilities.  This situation was exacerbated by the geographically-dispersed locations of 
the organizations and the ability of both of these organizations to acquire additional, 
needed capabilities that did not currently exist in their respective organizations, through 
their newly-awarded support contracts.  This resulted in an inefficient duplication of 
capabilities.  As an example, the EAP Lab would contract out for mechanical capabilities 
such as milling and machining of boxes that housed various circuit card assemblies and 
wiring harnesses.  Likewise, the Prototype Engineering Division would contract out for 
cable and wiring harness needed to support the development of various tactical operations 
centers.  Both the Prototype Engineering Division and the EAP Lab were content to 
continue this operational concept with little thought given to the opportunities and 
benefits associated with the integration of each organization’s capabilities.  In addition, 
EAP and Prototype Engineering Division business strategies were diametrically opposed.  
The Prototype Engineering Division strategy was to simply maintain the business base 
that had sustained them for the past ten to fifteen years.  Opportunities for growth 
occurred only by word-of-mouth or through increased business from existing missile 
system project offices.  There were no plans to target any new missile or aviation project 
offices as a means to achieve business growth.  The EAP Lab, on the other hand, had 
already achieved a significant level of growth due to selective marketing to both missile 
and aviation system project offices and sought out opportunities to the extent that 
facilities and contract cost ceilings would permit.  In addition, the EAP Lab worked with 
AMCOM organizations responsible for the management of the command Operation and 
Support Cost Reduction (OSCR) program to perform the nonrecurring engineering, and 
qualification of approved OSCR projects that supported missile and aviation system 
project offices.  This innovative concept, in effect used Army Materiel Command (AMC) 
OSCR funding to support the reduction of support costs by various system project 
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offices, such as the PATRIOT and Kiowa Warrior project offices, at significantly reduced 
costs compared to other alternatives.  Weapon systems were afforded a reduction in 
support costs through non-program funds and at a much more efficient cost.  The EAP 
Lab, through this initiative, strengthened their value to the missile community, but more 
importantly, achieved credibility within the Aviation Program Executive Office.   
C. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
In the late 1990’s, the Director of the Engineering Directorate required functional 
integration of the capabilities of both organizations.  Efforts were made to consider the 
use of each organizations capabilities when project office tasks bids were being 
developed.  For example, the Prototype Engineering Division incorporated EAP Lab 
cabling estimates into their bid to provide various shelter modifications for the PATRIOT 
project office.  The EAP Lab utilized box-machining estimates from the Prototype 
Engineering Division as a part of their bid to the Test Measurement Diagnostic 
Engineering Activity to prototype electronic test boxes.  As a result, the Prototype 
Engineering Division and the EAP Lab began to work together, and funding levels for 
both organizations grew and project offices were receiving a more efficient level of 
support. 
It was at this time that the nature of the tasks requested by project office 
customers began to change.  Both missile and aviation system project offices were 
soliciting more extensive, complex types of prototyping.  The EAP Lab, while still being 
utilized extensively for circuit board and cabling tasks, was being asked to build complex 
diagnostic boxes, capable of testing entire families of hardware.  The Prototype 
Engineering Division began to receive more interest from project offices to renovate 
shelters and tactical operations centers verses the build of piece-parts and test fixtures.  
The business profile for both the Prototype Engineering Division and the EAP Lab that 
had existed prior to the initiation of the PIF concept had also changed.  A combined 
funding base of $1.5 million in 1996 grew to $10 million per year of new business in 
2001.  In addition, larger and more complex tasks from aviation and missile system 
project offices were being performed, which necessitated closer working relationships 




The AMCOM has a long history of providing prototyping capability to meet 
project office requirements.  This prototyping capability, however, had been fragmented 
and disjointed and as a result had not provided the best possible product to project 
offices.  While progress has been made in integrating the electrical and mechanical 
prototyping capabilities that existed within the Engineering Directorate, significant 
opportunities for increased support due to the changing Department of Defense 
acquisition environment were being missed while this operational prototyping concept 
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III. PROGRAM MANAGER CHALLENGES AND INFLUENCES 
SUPPORTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PIF CONCEPT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the influences and challenges faced by 
weapon system program managers that provided the opportunity for the development of a 
unique prototyping support capability such as that of the PIF concept.  This chapter will 
address both the traditional challenges faced by weapon system program managers, as 
well as new challenges driven by recent events, as they balance the complex process of 
managing the acquisition of materiel to support the warfighter.  These challenges include 
those posed by the reduction of defense budgets in the post-Reagan-build down and the 
resulting decrease in readiness of aviation weapon systems, the current DoD and Army 
transformation initiatives, and the normal cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs.  
B. DEFENSE BUDGET HISTORY 
Present day program managers continue to battle the legacy left by the decrease in 
defense spending over the past fifteen years, particularly in defense procurement 
accounts.  Figure 2 (Reference 1.) shows that from 1985 to 2001, defense procurement 
decreased by thirty-four percent.   
This funding decrease, while negatively affecting procurement programs from 
every Service, had an indelible impact on Army aviation programs.  As a result, the Army 
is now required to modernize the current aviation fleet at a significant cost.  The Army 
will also reduce the total number of aircraft in the active force by more than 400 in the 
reserve forces by more than 600 as a means to minimize modernization costs.  This will 
include accelerating the retirement of the Vietnam-era UH-1 “Huey” helicopters and AH-
1 Cobra attack helicopters.  The acceleration will divest Army aviation of these “legacy” 
aircraft by 2004.  By the end of 2004 the operational fleet will consist of only four types 
of helicopters: the AH-64 Apache, the UH-60 Blackhawk, the OH-58 Kiowa, and the 
CH-47 Chinook.  (Reference 2.)  By 2004, the AH-64 Apache will have been in use by 
the Army for 20 years, the UH-60 Blackhawk 26 years, and the Ch-47 Chinook 34 years.  
And, because fielding of the Comanche system has been slipped to 2008, the OH-58 
Kiowa will remain a key capability in the Army’s aviation programs for several years to 
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come.  The resulting stress on the readiness of an already aging fleet of aviation systems, 
created a situation where aviation program managers are presently required to manage 
modernization programs that include provisions for increased readiness levels that 
ameliorate the significant decline in readiness that has occurred in the last ten years.  
Many of the aviation modernization efforts, such as those to install common transponder 
radios into the OH-58 Kiowa, do not involve large complex efforts, and as such, lend 
themselves for adoption of non-traditional means of acquisition. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Changes in the Defense Budget. 
 
C. DOD AND ARMY TRANSFORMATION 
The DoD and the Army are both undergoing significant change through 
transformation programs.  This transformation was initiated early in 2000 and became 
more focused after the events of September 11, 2001. 
One of the President’s key defense priorities is to transform America’s armed 
forces to perform their missions more effectively and to meet emerging security 
challenges.  The Defense Department began the process of transformation with its 2001 
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Quadrennial Defense Review.  This review shifted to a “capabilities-based” defense 
strategy that focuses on the capabilities of potential adversaries and the tools that 
America’s armed forces will need to deter and defeat adversaries employing those 
capabilities.  Both the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent 
conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, underscore the urgency of 
military transformation.  They illustrate the need for America’s military to prepare for 
different types of conflict and execute missions with new tactics and new technologies.  
The growing use of unmanned aerial vehicles, the effective utilization of real-time 
intelligence, and the coordination among special operations and allied forces all 
demonstrate the cutting edge of what military transformation can achieve and offer a 
glimpse of a future transformed joint force.  (Reference 3.)   
The Department of Army has created their transformation strategy to conform to 
that of the President and the DoD.  Army Transformation focuses on delivering land 
power capabilities to meet 21st Century strategic requirements, and rests squarely within 
emerging joint operational concepts and capabilities.  More than building and procuring 
new systems and platforms, Army transformation combines advanced technologies, 
organizations, people, and processes, with concepts to create new sources of military 
power that are more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and 
sustainable.  The Army will integrate its development efforts for these new capabilities 
with those of the joint community, and assess them through joint and Service 
experimentation.  This process will produce increasingly responsive capabilities and 
dominant formations that are modular and scalable. (Reference 4.)  Figure 3 depicts the 
Army’s three-pronged approach to transformation. (Reference 5.) 
The Legacy Force is the Army as it is currently configured and is what guarantees 
near- term warfighting readiness to support the National Military Strategy.  To sustain a 
force that provides the necessary combat overmatch at an affordable price, the Army 
must rebuild and selectively upgrade legacy force systems.  This “recapitalization” and 
modernization effort will return selected systems to like-new condition and extend Army 
capabilities into the future. (Reference 5.)  Modernization and recapitilization of the AH-
64 Apache, the UH-60 Blackhawk, the Ch-47 Chinook, and the PATRIOT missile 
systems to sustain the Army until fielding of Interim and Objective Force capabilities 
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present program managers of these systems with the need to achieve their fielding 
objectives in a timely manner so as to sustain the warfighter.  An example of the benefit 
of utilizing an alternative such as the PIF has been provided from a modernization 
perspective.  The PIF alternative also has potential as aviation and missile weapon 
systems are recapitalized as well.  The use of a “best-value” approach to recapitilization, 
through the recognition of each component as a separate entity, and the use of alternative 
contracting mechanisms, presents program managers with an option to original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) management of recapitalization programs.  In addition, 
the need for rapid development and deployment of the objective force system lends itself 
to the use of alternative procurement strategies to meet the fielding requirements as 
directed by the Department of Army and DoD. 
 
Figure 3.   Army Transformation. 
 
D. COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE 
Program managers are charged to design, develop, fabricate, integrate, test, and 
field a system or systems in the fastest, most economical means possible.  The challenge 
for the program manager to balance the tradeoffs between cost, schedule and 
performance has become even greater given the changed environment that exists today.  
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While performance may remain a fairly stable requirement to a program manager, 
opportunities to influence cost and schedule tradeoffs exist because of conditions that 
have emerged in the last five to ten years.  These conditions include OEMs with high 
overhead rates and who do not have the time to work non-recurring type efforts, and the 
lengthy procurement process.  Program managers that are strapped with an OEM with a 
high overhead rate will be faced with the prospect of procuring reduced system 
quantities.  The lengthy procurement process that program manager’s face often impacts 
the system schedule including fielding milestones.  These conditions create both cost and 
schedule impacts on a program manager and the need to consider other alternatives as 
mitigating measures. 
E. SUMMARY 
Program managers are required to weigh many factors in the course of managing 
their systems.  The traditional pressures of managing cost, schedule, and performance 
have increased due to the increase in activity associated with declining defense budgets 
and the DoD and Army transformation activities.  This additional pressure has created the 
prospect for program managers to consider alternative means of acquiring the systems for 
which they are responsible.  The PIF concept is one of the alternatives available to 
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IV. THE PIF CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will describe the PIF concept, including its structure, challenges, and 
benefits provided to program managers to date.  The business strategy, organizational 
structure, facilities, contractual, and capability elements associated with the PIF will be 
discussed in detail. 
The name PIF, Prototype Integration Facility, is a misnomer in that the PIF is 
more than a facility.  It is a strategy with many facets and the ability to touch disparate 
aspects of the acquisition process, and is built upon the foundation of prototyping 
experience that has existed at AMCOM for the past twenty-five years.  The PIF concept 
was built exclusively around being a value-added prototyping capability for program 
managers, by leveraging the most cost effective expertise available to meet a weapon 
system requirement.  The achievement of this objective was based upon the fundamental 
ability of Engineering Directorate prototyping personnel to establish partnering 
agreements with several different organizations, both in Government and industry, 
through the identification of a unique business strategy that would be of benefit to all 
involved.  In addition, the traditional use of facilities, personnel, and contracting 
strategies were altered to support the PIF concept. 
B. BUSINESS STRATEGY 
The PIF was established to provide a rapid, in-house response capability for 
weapon system solutions.  The PIF is a Government-Owned, Government-Operated 
(GOGO) capability that provides customized and fully integrated turnkey solutions via 
unprecedented design and engineering expertise, rapid prototyping, mechanical 
fabrication, circuit card assembly, cables and chassis build-up, platform integration, 
advanced manufacturing technologies, and program management, to support program 
manager’s requirements to get the product in the hands of the soldier by the most 
expedient means possible.   
From multi-functional, multi-faceted integration projects, to simplistic machining 
and fabrication, the PIF has been able to build prototypes, few-of-a-kind, and limited 
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production hardware, to the highest Government and industry standards.  The PIF has 
offered the customer a “One Stop Shopping” environment that ensures the warfighter the 
absolute best technical solution, at the best price and level of quality, and one that 
adheres to the schedule.  Prototype Integration Facility hardware integration has been 
executed by utilizing the integrated product team methodology, with specialists from 
each PIF organizational element, to include Government teaming arrangements with 
industry partners.  The PIF organizational and operational concept has provided for an 
unparalleled simplicity when compared to the normal acquisition and programmatic 
arenas.  The PIF organizational structure and contractual vehicles have offered the 
customer virtually unlimited programmatic flexibility.   
The PIF marketing strategy took advantage of the geographic proximity of the PIF 
to three major Army program executive offices (PEOs):  Air and Missile Defense 
(AMD), Tactical Missiles (TM), and Aviation.  The AMD and TM PEOs had been doing 
an extensive amount of business with the prototyping organization prior to the 
formulation of the PIF concept.  The prospects for additional business in both of these 
PEOs, along with other established customers, such as the Marine Corps and the Test, 
Measurement, and Diagnostic Engineering Activity, were excellent.  The Aviation PEO, 
however, provided the most extensive opportunity for the PIF.  The PIF strategy in this 
area was to take advantage of the many capabilities in an Army Aviation Corridor of 
Excellence (AACE), bounded by Redstone Arsenal and the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) 
Arnold Engineering Development Center in the north, and Eglin Air Force Base’s 46th 
Test Wing capability, and the U.S. Army Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker in the south.  The 
depth of knowledge and experience in many specific areas throughout the AACE would 
provide efficient and responsive accomplishment of many of the tasks faced by the PIF.  
Utilizing the AACE integrated the total aviation community, and supported optimized 
capital investment for the Government as well as industry.  It not only provided for 
continuous, comprehensive evaluations, but also made full spectrum testing more 
affordable. 
A key strategic element of the PIF concept was to make it as easy as possible for 
weapon system managers to do business with the PIF.  A top-level process was 
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developed, that took advantage of customer inputs and past experiences.  Figure 4 shows 
the PIF execution strategy that was developed and utilized (Reference 6.) 
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Figure 4.   PIF Execution Strategy. 
 
The first step in doing business with the PIF is to identify the need or requirement.  
In the aforementioned paragraphs, the PIF’s marketing strategy briefly discussed how the 
PIF planned to market its capabilities and grow the PIF business base.  In addition to 
customers coming directly to the PIF, the PIF has been in a position to propose efforts to 
accomplish upgrades and known modification requirements, as well as solutions for 
known problems.  A constant liaison with potential customers, such as the Assistant 
Project Managers, Product Managers, Program Managers, the Integrated Materiel 
Management Center (IMMC), and AMRDEC elements, have allowed the PIF to propose 
assistance relatively soon after a need or requirement materializes.   
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The next step in the PIF execution process has been to define the requirement.  
The primary focus of the PIF concept has been to offer the customer a Government-to-
Government interface where open communication can flow freely to properly define the 
requirement or project.  Through utilization of the Alpha Contracting methodology, the 
PIF has worked hand-in-hand with the customer to develop a viable acquisition approach.  
In those instances where the requirement has not been accurately documented, i.e., 
existing Statement of Work (SOW), the PIF has been required to draft all acquisition 
documentation, with input from the customer.  As required, and prior to release of 
proposal, the PIF Project Management Team has required physical viewing of hardware, 
host platforms, Government-Furnished Equipment/Property (GFE/GFP), performance 
specifications, technical manuals, and technical data packages (TDPs), all in an effort to 
maximize the quality of the proposal cost estimate. 
The assembly of the proposal development team is the third step in the PIF 
execution process.  The PIF Program Manager (PM) Team Leader has served as the focal 
point and IPT lead for proposal development.  As requirements have been finalized, the 
PM Team Leader has formalized the necessary personnel, skills, and support to complete 
the requirement.  Once the customer feels comfortable with the SOW or requirement, the 
PM Team Leader assembles the necessary PIF elements required to develop a proposal or 
Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimate. 
The fourth step in the PIF execution process is to determine the required 
resources.  The PIF PM Team Leader is the ultimate authority for determining the 
resources necessary to develop the proper teaming arrangement with the PIF’s 
Government and industry partners.  This has included review of the design and analysis 
of requirements, modeling and simulation capabilities, development, design and test 
facilities required, hardware capabilities and fabrication assets, System Integration 
Laboratories (SIL), environmental testing/qualification, assembly, integration facets, and 
air-worthiness considerations.  The primary goal of the PIF PM Team Lead has been to 
assemble the necessary capabilities and resources to propose the recommended mix based 
upon the most effective source.  Where feasible, the goal of the PIF has been to assemble 
the best possible team at a fair and reasonable price to meet customer needs and to 
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perform as much work as possible within the confines of the PIF Facilities or existing 
Government infrastructure.    
The development of the PIF proposal is the next step in the PIF execution process.  
The PIF PM Team Lead is fully responsible for project planning, proposal preparation, 
management, scheduling, and execution activities and serves as IPT lead for the proposal 
development team.  The PIF PM Team Lead collects, analyzes, and interjects all cost data 
from sources external to the PIF.  In the event PIF in-house resources have not been 
adequate to fulfill the customer’s needs, the contractor program manager, serving on the 
IPT, has been tasked to develop a Technical Directive Execution Plan (TDEP).  The 
Contracting Officers Representative (COR), issues a request for TDEP to the contractor.  
Unless otherwise delineated by the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO), the PCO and 
COR are the only individuals authorized to issue such requests.  The contractor responds 
only to requests from these authorized individuals.  Within seven calendar days of receipt 
of the Technical Directive SOW, the contractor submits a TDEP to the COR or his 
designated representative.  The contractor provides, as a minimum, several types of 
information.  This includes a complete and concise description of the technical approach, 
to include, but not limited to, proposed subcontractors and facilities to satisfy the 
requirements of the technical directive SOW.  The contractor addresses all applicable 
elements of the overarching technical support for the PIF Statement of Work, and 
identifies the labor allocation mix, total hours inputted to each labor category, as well as 
the company labor category and the number of hours for each individual assigned to the 
labor category for the specific TDEP.  The contractor also provides one page resumes for 
each assigned individual for review and approval prior to commencement of work.  The 
contractor provides cost breakdowns by labor, materials, other direct costs (ODC) and 
total TDEP cost.  Material costs provided identify raw materials and any associated 
material handling charges, as applicable, and describe the nature and cost associated with 
each ODC.  Finally, the contractor develops and provides a program schedule (e.g., 
GANTT chart) that identifies, but is not limited to, start and completion dates for all 
critical technical directive tasks and sub-tasks. 
The next step in the PIF execution process is to staff the final proposal through 
PIF management to insure that the proposal is complete and presents an accurate, 
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executable strategy to the customer.  At this point, the proposal/ROM is ready for 
presentation to the customer.  This may be accomplished via email, formal briefings, or 
hand-carry to customer, and is determined by the desires of the customer, but also is 
influenced by the size of the project and level of PIF commitment required, and 
precedents, which may have been previously established.  At this point, an open 
communication environment exists and negotiations to secure the project have normally 
ensued.  In cases where negotiations have resulted in major changes, a reworked 
proposal/ROM is resubmitted to the customer.  The goal has been to offer the customer 
flexibility to allow the PIF to accomplish all or parts of a customer’s requirements.   
Once the customer approves the PIF proposal, expediting the receipt and handling 
of the funding for the PIF project has been a primary consideration.  Proper safeguards 
have been included which assure funding is expended as scheduled, and proper 
notification is provided to the customer when expenditures reach an agreed-upon 
percentage of the total.  The PIF organizational and operational structure goal has been to 
offer an acquisition-streamlined environment, which allows for rapid acquisition and 
obligation of customer and direct site funding.  Schedule considerations and risk 
mitigation have been a primary focal point for successful project management.  The PM 
Team Lead develops the initial milestones and executes to the approved schedule, as 
agreed to in the proposal/ROM and the initial kick-off meeting.  The PIF then establishes 
realistic exit criteria for each PIF project phase, utilizing evaluation of performance 
against metrics, conduct of in-process reviews (IPRs), scrutiny of status reports and other 
project management tools to ascertain the cost, schedule, and performance attributes of 
each assigned PIF project.   
For Aviation-related projects, a key product has been the Airworthiness Release 
(AWR).  The PIF has addressed AWR throughout these efforts, through the early 
involvement of the AMCOM Aviation Engineering Directorate (AED), to assure smooth 
and rapid processing of the AWR paperwork.  As deemed appropriate, the PIF has sought 
early involvement to expedite the Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for those aircraft 
governed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations.  Upon completion of all 
necessary testing and qualification, products are then delivered to the customer.  For 
aviation assets, airworthiness is normally addressed by one of the contractual 
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deliverables, as an AWR or STC.  As previously negotiated with the customer, other 
deliverables have included performance or product specifications, tests/demonstrations, 
technical reports, prototype hardware or software, a complete Modification Work Order 
(MWO) kit suitable for production, or limited production of MWO Kits, validated Level 
I, II or III technical data packages (TDPs).  Whatever the product, it has been the goal of 
the PIF that products be delivered on or ahead of schedule, at or below cost, and fully 
qualified and in congruence with the contract/SOW. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Figure 5 depicts the PIF organizational structure (Reference 7.).  This structure 
reflects the leveraging of several organizations, both Government and industry, that 
support the PIF business strategy.   
1. PIF Core Organizational Structure 
The top level of the PIF organizational structure reflects the PIF core 
organizational structure.  The PIF core is comprised of Government personnel who 
maintain PIF operational control.  Personnel at this level are Prototype Engineering 
Division and EAP Lab personnel who have been collocated and operate functionally as 
one organization.  This level is subdivided based upon the various areas of responsibility 
that one would expect to see in a prototype environment.  Each of these personnel’s roles 
and responsibilities has been defined to support PIF objectives. 
The PIF Manager reports directly to the Deputy Director, Engineering Directorate 
and provides strategic guidance to all PIF organizational elements.  The PIF Manager has 
established strategic organizational goals and evaluated actual PIF performance in 
seeking to achieve these goals.  The PIF Manager exercises full authority over all PIF 
projects, workload, assets, and funding, and is responsible for the planning, managing 




Figure 5.   PIF Organizational Structure. 
 
All PIF projects will be managed through a PIF Project Management Team 
Leader.  The Project Management Team Leaders report directly to the PIF Manager and 
exercise complete responsibility and authority for coordinating, planning, staffing, 
directing, and controlling assigned PIF projects.  The PIF project management 
functionality is segregated into four primary areas or four Project Management Teams; 
these are (1) Aviation Systems Team, (2) Missile Systems Team, (3) Research & 
Development (R&D) Team and (4) Special Projects Team.  As the PIF mission and 
workload evolves, these areas are periodically reviewed to identify spikes in workload 
and customer base issues to insure that the availability of the correct mix of project 
management resources are allocated to support the PIF mission and meet customer needs.   
The PIF Business and Operations Team is responsible for planning, scheduling, 
directing, coordinating, and controlling all PIF business, financial, programmatic, and 
facility operations activities.  These activities include, but are not limited to, project 
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planning, budget formulation, project execution, project/workload evaluation, financial 
management, review and analysis, cost estimating, procurement, marketing, facilities 
operations, information technology, and management reporting functions.  For ease of 
operations, the Business and Operations Team is segregated into two primary focal areas, 
the Facility Operations Team and the Business & Financial Management Team.  The PIF 
Business and Operations Team Leader also reports to the PIF Manager. 
The PIF Engineering Team Leader exercises complete responsibility and 
authority for the engineering/technical management of PIF projects.  The PIF 
Engineering Team provides engineering inputs to PIF project planning, proposal, 
management, scheduling, and execution activities, and advises the PIF Manager in their 
area of engineering/technical management to facilitate the execution of organizational 
and management activities.  The PIF Engineering Team also works hand-in-hand with 
PIF Project Management Team Leaders to allocate Engineering Team resources to 
support PIF projects.  These activities include the identification of personnel, the 
development of proposals and quotations, workload management, and identification of 
proprietary data/sources. 
The PIF Manufacturing Team Leader also reports directly to the PIF Manager and 
exercises complete responsibility and authority for all manufacturing functionality of PIF 
projects.  The PIF Manufacturing Team provides technical support for manufacturing and 
manufacturing control processes, systems, and services relating primarily to 
prototyping/production processes, resources, and facilities.  In addition, the PIF 
Manufacturing Team Leader coordinates and participates in the analysis, design, 
development, and maintenance of manufacturing business processes and systems, which 
primarily support the PIF manufacturing operations.  
The PIF Quality Assurance Team Leader exercises complete responsibility and 
authority for administering the PIF quality assurance program.  The PIF Quality 
Assurance Team provides quality inputs to PIF project planning, proposal, management, 
scheduling, and execution activities and advises the PIF Manager in their area of quality 
assurance to facilitate the execution of organizational and management activities.  The 
PIF Quality Assurance Team also ensures that all business processes and all material 
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being developed, procured, manufactured, rebuilt, modified, integrated, or stored in PIF 
are in accordance with approved design requirements, specifications and guiding quality 
improvement principles.  And lastly, the PIF Quality Assurance Team is responsible for 
establishing, administering, and maintaining the PIF quality assurance program for all 
PIF activities. 
2. Governmental Organizational Partners 
Establishing strategic relationships with other Government organizations, both 
AMCOM and non-AMCOM, has been critical to the success of the PIF.  The second 
level of the PIF organizational structure reflects a cross-section of Governmental 
organizations that the PIF has teamed with.  Under the PIF business strategy, as weapon 
system requirements are identified and resources sought to satisfy system requirements, 
the PIF has canvassed a variety of Government organizations for cost effective expertise.  
These include the vast technical capabilities within the AMRDEC, and include the 
Software Engineering Directorate, the Missile Guidance Directorate, the Aviation 
Engineering Directorate, the Propulsion and Structures Directorate, the Aviation Applied 
Technology Directorate, and the System Simulation and Development Directorate.  
Corpus Christi Army Depot and Letterkenny Army Depot, both of whom report to the 
AMCOM Commander, also have partnering relationships with the PIF.  Other, non-
AMCOM Governmental organizations partnered with the PIF include the Redstone 
Technical Test Center (RTTC), the Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC), and the 
Logistics Support Facility.  The PIF has initiated discussions with the NASA Marshall 
Space Flight Center and the Defense Advanced Projects Agency to develop partnering 
relationships that will also be of benefit to aviation and missile weapon system program 
managers.   
3. Industry Organizational Partners 
The PIF concept also required, and therefore included, a partnering relationship 
with industry, to include small businesses, small minority-owned businesses, OEMs, and 
other industry partners who offer the capability-specific expertise required to support the 
prototyping requirements of aviation and missile program managers.  The bottom-level of 
the PIF organizational structure identifies PIF industry team member’s to-date.  The ten-
year, $1.1 billion PIF Rapid Acquisition Prototype (RAP) contract, awarded to the Joint 
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Venture, Yulista, Science and Engineering Services, Inc. (JVYS), is the mechanism 
through which industry partners with the PIF. 
The inclusion of the OEMs in the PIF organizational structure, while seemingly 
odd, was an absolute necessity when crafting the strategy.  While there have been limited 
instances where the PIF was able to successfully compete with OEMs to secure tasks, it 
was not the stated intent of the PIF to do so.  The inclusion of the OEMs into the PIF 
structure was deemed a critical element in providing program managers with the cost 
effective prototyping support that they required.  Many contractor-operated prototyping 
operations seek to solely compete with the OEM as an alternative to meeting program 
manager requirements.  The PIF concept was developed to include OEM capabilities, 
such as engineering and technical data support, due to the necessity to access these and 
other OEM capabilities, to support the requirements of program managers. 
The addition of other capability-specific industry members was also one of the 
key facets to the PIF partnering strategy.  The companies that comprise this category are 
able to integrate their capabilities with those of the OEMs and the Government to provide 
an efficient and economical product to the program manager.  Many of these industry 
partners have existing capabilities and facilities, some of which are Government-
sponsored, that the PIF has been able to leverage in the course of doing business with 
aviation and weapon system program managers. 
Small business and small, minority-owned businesses have been a key thrust in 
the development of the PIF strategy.  The PIF business strategy has been to graduate 
itself from piece-part and component-level tasks, to larger, more platform oriented 
integration types of tasks.  This business strategy has afforded the PIF the opportunity to 
develop and utilize small businesses and small, minority-owned businesses to provide the 
component-level capabilities, such as circuit boards and machined components, to 
support the PIF business strategy. 
The fundamental strategy of the PIF has been to provide program managers with a 
cost effective alternative to acquire materiel.  Accomplishment of this strategic objective 
required the integration of existing prototyping capabilities with other expertise, both 
internal and external to the Government, and both internal and external to AMCOM.  
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This unification laid the foundation that would allow the leveraging of a diverse, cost 
effective set of capabilities that could be accessed to provide a best value capability to the 
growing needs of weapon system program managers. 
D. THE PIF RAPID ACQUISITION PROTOTYPING CONTRACT 
From the outset, it was clear, that a unique, flexible contracting mechanism would 
be required to fulfill the increasingly demanding needs of aviation and missile program 
managers, and to take advantage of existing prototyping opportunities.  The ten-year, 
$1.1 billion PIF Rapid Acquisition Prototyping (RAP) contract was awarded in June 2002 
to support the PIF concept and to meet the needs of aviation and missile program 
managers. 
The process to achieve award of the PIF RAP contract began in January 2001.  A 
market survey was conducted through the assistance of the AMCOM Small Business 
Administration (SBA) and the use of PRO-NET, an internet-based program, as the need 
for a flexible contract mechanism was identified.  An Indian tribe, Yulista Management 
Services Incorporated, was identified as a potential source and a capabilities briefing was 
presented to PIF Manager, PIF Team Leaders, and the PIF Contracting Officer’s 
Representative (COR).  On 19 March 2002, the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
approved the joint venture agreement between Yulista Management Services Inc. and 
Science & Engineering Services (SES) Inc.  The PIF RAP contract, a sole-source Cost 
Plus Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract, was awarded to the Joint Venture, Yulista, Science and 
Engineering Services, Inc (JVYS), an eligible Section 8(a) concern owned and controlled 
by an economically-disadvantaged Indian Tribe, as permitted by FAR 19.805-1 (b) (2).  
The JVYS, through this contract mechanism, serves as the PIF prime contractor.  
Although the JVYS concept employs partnerships with key industry subcontractors and 
preferred aviation and missile OEMs, the PIF maintains privity of contract with JVYS.  It 
is the responsibility of JVYS to execute and manage all subcontractor and/or preferred 
OEM contractual vehicles.   
It is the sole responsibility of the PIF Project Management Team Leader to 
ascertain internal and external resources required to meet specific project requirements.  
Once a determination has been made that PIF internal resources are not adequate to meet 
a customer’s need, the PIF Project Management Team provides the JVYS with a 
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proposed technical Directive Execution Plan (TDEP) SOW for the effort required.  Any 
tasking or technical directive is required to be within the scope of the overarching PIF 
RAP SOW.  The PIF Project Management Team Leader is the primary point of contact 
for interface and coordination of issues or questions concerning JVYS proposal 
development.  The JVYS is responsible for developing a TDEP that is clear, concise, and 
that specifically addresses the requirements down to the project-level SOW/technical 
directive.  The JVYS TDEP, at a minimum, addresses the requirements of the TDEP 
SOW or technical directive, subcontractor teaming arrangements, proposed 
facilities/equipment, and those work elements to be performed by each of the principal 
parties, as well as cost, schedule, and performance attributes.  Additionally, the cost and 
schedule proposal assigns performance metrics for each principal party involved in the 
project. 
The PIF RAP contract has been structured to provide maximum utility to program 
managers.  A twenty-one day turn-around-time has been set to exercise options or task 
directives once requirements have been initiated.  This element of the PIF RAP contract 
allows program managers the opportunity to reduce the cycle time normally associated 
with traditional procurement processes.  In addition, the program manager reduces 
funding risk through the expeditious obligation and disbursement of funds when utilizing 
this contract vehicle.  The PIF RAP contract, advantageous due to its quick turn-around 
features, also provides added benefits when utilized.  Negotiated composite labor rates 
for contractor personnel are extremely low, as are the low G&A fees for the JVYS and 
subcontractors.  Material costs are not passed through the JVYS, which further reduces 
the cost to the program manager.   
E. FACILITIES 
In order for the PIF concept to properly evolve, a facility would be needed, not 
just to centralize the geographically-dispersed prototyping capabilities that existed at 
AMCOM, but more importantly, to facilitate the integration of all of the capabilities 
required to support the developing PIF business strategy. 
The pre-PIF prototyping facilities were located throughout Redstone Arsenal.  
Building 4762, which housed the mechanical prototyping capability, was a 1940’s 
vintage building comprised of 32,000 square feet.  This building was located five miles 
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from the AMRDEC main facility, Building 5400, and was in dire need of costly repairs.  
Replacement of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system and replacement of 
the collapsing ceiling was estimated to require in excess of $1 million.  The EAP Lab 
consisted of approximately 5,000 square feet of floor space and was scattered throughout 
Building 5400.  These accommodations were not suitable, either functionally or 
geographically, to support the basic prototyping needs of aviation and missile weapon 
system program managers. 
In 2000, the Engineering Directorate was presented with the opportunity to secure 
the funding for the design and construction of a facility, whose primary focus was on the 
prototyping of weapon system hardware.  After several months of discussions with 
Redstone Arsenal Support Activity and Corps of Engineers personnel, $9.9 million in 
funding was acquired to design build a 60,000 square foot Prototype Integration Facility.  
Figure 6 shows the Larry O. Daniel Prototype Integration Facility.  This facility includes 
a 173ft by 75 ft high-bay area with two 20-ton overhead cranes, a 10,000 square foot low-
bay integration area, a 102,600 square foot exterior hardstand area capable of 
withstanding 3000 p.s.i., and a helicopter landing-pad meeting FAA specifications. 
 
Figure 6.   The Larry O. Daniel Prototype Integration Facility. 
 
These capabilities/facilities permit on-site integration of hardware and software directly 
into a variety of aerial and ground platforms, including helicopters, Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs), Highly Mobile Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 5-ton 
trucks, and tanks.  Figure 7 portrays a portion of the PIF high-bay as PATRIOT Battery 
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Command Post Vehicles are assembled.  The PIF high-bay allows for flexible 
reconfiguration to support a wide range of aviation and missile hardware.   
 
Figure 7.   PIF High Bay. 
 
The PIF low-bay integration area, shown in Figure 8, provides precision fabrication 
capabilities in machining, sheet metal, welding, and painting.  The low-bay also 
incorporates a mechanical department and state-of-the-art equipment that can produce 
various types of fabrication solutions and offers a wide capability for hardware 
manufacturing. Mechanical manufacturing capabilities include all types of general and 
precision metal machining, sheet metal fabrication/work, welding, assembly, and 
finishing/painting. In-house capabilities in the areas of specialized coatings including 
Chemical Agent Resistant Coating (CARC), plating, heat-treating, and other specialized 




Figure 8.   PIF Low Bay Integration Area. 
 
Figure 9 shows a UH-60 Blackhawk making use of the PIF landing pad.  The PIF landing 
pad capability allows for the timely modification of all aviation systems. 
The Larry O. Daniel Prototype Integration Facility was dedicated in July 2002, 
and serves as the centerpiece of the PIF concept.  The PIF was named for Dr. Larry O. 
Daniel, the former Director of the Engineering Directorate, who was the driving visionary 
behind the PIF concept.  This facility has provided the infrastructure that has allowed the 
PIF concept to flourish, and Dr. Daniel’s vision to be achieved. 
The PIF concept, while utilizing the Larry O. Daniel PIF as a centerpiece, is not 
solely dependent on this facility to accomplish PIF tasks.  The PIF, through its strategic 
partnering relationships with other Governmental and industrial organizations, has the 
ability to utilize associated facilities as necessary.  The use of the RTTC, Software 
Engineering Directorate, and JVYS facilities has already occurred in the performance of 
aviation and missile prototype efforts.  
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Figure 9.   PIF Landing Pad. 
 
F. PIF CAPABILITIES 
The PIF concept is built on the ability to leverage the capabilities necessary to 
meet the needs of aviation and missile program managers.  Many of the capabilities 
utilized in the performance of efforts to support these needs exist within the PIF.  The PIF 
provides a menu of the internal capabilities available to aviation and missile weapon 
system program managers.  This menu comprises any level or complexity of capability 
that a program manager may need to satisfy a requirement. 
The PIF includes an extensive circuit card design and layout laboratory.  
Engineering schematics and component specifications are developed and transferred into 
producible circuit board designs, which are fabricated at the PIF, tested, and loaded with 
the requisite components required for integration or evaluation purposes.  The circuit 
board laboratory utilizes powerful computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided 
manufacturing (CAM) tools combined with an experienced staff to complete such layouts 
as radio frequency (RF) boards, Ball Grid Array Technology (BGA), high-speed 
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electronics, and high-power requirements.  The PIF also incorporates the industry leading 
Cadence Spectra auto-router for faster completion of dense layouts.  The Soldering 
Laboratory utilizes soldering processes that are in accordance with industry standards, 
including Soldering Workmanship Criteria IPC/EIA J-STD-001 Class 3, and Electro 
Static Discharge Controls in accordance with ANSI/ESD S20.20.  Soldering experience 
includes the fabrication of hardware from very simple to the most complex 
configurations.  Process control methodology is relied upon to ensure consistent quality 
levels during the manufacture of products.  Areas defined and controlled include 
materials, methods, and acceptance criteria for producing satisfactory solder connections.  
Capabilities include soldering and repair of older designs, prototype designs, and new 
designs that incorporate through-hole and/or surface-mount technology. 
The Electronic, Simulation, and Analysis Modeling (ESAM) capability provides a 
risk reduction tool to program managers through the utilization of circuit analysis 
software to perform simulation, analysis, and modeling of electronic circuits.  The ESAM 
team is able to provide technical, cost, and schedule risk reduction to customers by 
modeling and analyzing electronics circuits for safety, reliability, and performance.  
Safety issues with electronics designs, including those that involve ordnance-firing 
devices, are addressed through the ESAM capability.  The ability to perform sneak-circuit 
analysis to identify potential sneak electrical paths is also part of this capability.  The 
ESAM team is able to improve system reliability by identifying electrically-overstressed 
components and recommend design solutions for marginal designs.  When failures do 
occur, the ESAM team is able to determine the root cause and develop and validate 
design solutions.  The ability to model missile flight control electronics, including 
electrical and thermal batteries, to evaluate and validate system performance is a key 
component of the ESAM capability.  
The PIF provides proactive obsolescence management, early in the life cycle of a 
weapon or aviation system as a critical tool for maintaining operational readiness for 
complex aviation and missile weapon systems.  The accelerating pace of electronic 
advances, Commercial-off-the-Shelf/Non-developmental Item (COTS/NDI) insertion, 
extension of weapon system life cycles, and emerging aging aircraft issues is presenting 
new obsolescence management challenges to Army program managers.  Addressing the 
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increasing complexity of obsolescence management, the PIF has an established program 
utilizing processes and procedures in accordance with DoD policy for identifying and 
resolving obsolescence issues.  Prototype Integration Facility obsolescence management 
capabilities include acquisition contract scope of work preparation, proposal 
evaluation/negotiations, comprehensive obsolescence management risk assessments, 
program parts selection, component availability projections, projected obsolescence 
resolution of sustainment costs for out-year budgeting, redesign and testing of obsolete 
hardware, obsolescence notice alert monitoring and notification, and Continuous 
Technology Refreshment (CTR) analysis. 
The Visualization-Based Design Laboratory (VIZ Lab) designs, develops, and 
produces advanced 3-D solid, data, and virtual models for weapon system engineering, 
logistics, and program management disciplines.  The VIZ Lab’s robust structure allows it 
to align and progress as the modeling industry develops new technologies and techniques 
on the road to fostering an overall collaborative engineering environment.  The VIZ Lab 
can expand into newly-emerging areas and implement innovative capabilities that track 
with state-of-the-industry tools and products.  The VIZ Lab provides the aviation and 
missile community with the capability to create 3-D engineering models for visualization, 
simulation, and virtual prototyping of designs used in customized engineering analysis 
and logistical applications.  Engineering modeling functions within the VIZ Lab include 
reverse engineering, 3-D CAD model generation, comprehensive weapon system models, 
component and assembly models, and low-fidelity/artistic renderings.  Models developed 
within the VIZ Lab are used in applications for CAD design; engineering analysis; 
operation, setup and maintenance manuals; interactive multimedia instruction; training; 
engineering animations of collision and interference detection; and engineering 
kinematics and dynamic analysis. 
The PIF also provides a rapid, state-of-the-art virtual prototyping capability, 
which allows verification and optimization of designs quickly and accurately, resulting in 
time and cost savings when compared to traditional prototyping methods.  Utilizing state-
of-the-art technologies, parts can be quickly and economically fabricated in various 
materials, such as plastic, wax, epoxy, laminated paper, polycarbonate, solid starch and 
various types of metals, depending on intended use.  Whether a customer needs to access 
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to interfaces and ergonomics, or just needs a physical demonstration piece to articulate a 
concept, the PIF can quickly turn drawing/engineering files into reality.  During the 
design phase, the PIF’s rapid, virtual prototyping technologies provide a streamlined 
verification system for hardware concepts, as well as checkpoints later in the process. 
Rapid, virtual prototyping capabilities include Stereo Lithography, Fuse Deposition 
Modeling, Laminated Object Manufacturing, Selective Laser Sintering, Three-
Dimensional Printing, Multi-Jet Modeling, and Laser Engineered Net Shaping (LENS). 
G. RESULTS 
The initial indications are that the PIF concept, after only eight months in full 
implementation, has been very popular among program managers, especially among 
those in the aviation area.  Figure 10 depicts a snapshot of the PIF business environment 
as it exists today (Reference 8.).  This chart shows the spike in PIF business after the 
opening of the PIF and the subsequent award of the PIF RAP contract.  To date, $18 
million of new business has been generated since June 2002.  Fiscal Year 02 sales are 
projected at approximately $32 million, with opportunities to significantly increase this 
amount through the execution of several efforts that remain in the proposal/negotiation 
cycle or have just been initiated.  The $18 million of new business is the result of the PIF 
securing several new efforts.  These include the Blue Force Tracking, Enhancement 
Information System, the Mobile Tower System, the Tactical Terminal Control System, 
the Common Transponder, and the Blackhawk Global Positioning System. 
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Figure 10.   PIF Sales. 
 
The Blue Force Tracking, Enhancement Information System effort is a quick-
turnaround, $20 million program that will upgrade information systems to allow for the 
tracking of friendly forces in forward areas.   
Figure 11 provides a depiction of the Blue Force Tracking, Enhancement 
Information System functional architecture.  The Blue Force Tracking, Enhancement 
Information System will provide the aviation fleet the ability to transmit and receive 
situational awareness and command and control information between air and ground 
platforms, the ability to display air and ground locations for all friendly forces on an 
electronic map in the host platform display, and provision for exchange of email text 
between platforms. 
This task was initiated in FY 02 and will be completed by FY 03.  The PIF is 
teamed with the Aviation Applied Technology Directorate and will fabricate and install 
96 Phase 3 and 4 systems on AH-64s, UH-60s, and CH-47s by 1 December 2002, 160 
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Phase 5 systems on AH-64s, UH-60s, CH-47s, and OH-58s during CY03, and upgrade all 




Figure 11.   Blue Force Tracking, Enhancement Information System. 
 
The Mobile Tower System (MOTS) is a six-year $36 million program that will 
provide the Army a with a quick, deployable, highly-mobile air traffic control tower to be 
used at remote airfields.  Figure 12 provides an illustration of the MOTS.  The PIF is 
teamed with the RTTC and has initiated the first phase of this effort, which is to build one 
39 
prototype MOTS, integrate Airborne Radio Communications (ARC) 220 and Platoon 
Radio Communications (PRC) 117’s into the tower, integrate 10 Kilowatt generators on 
trailers, coordinate electromagnetic interference (EMI), electromagnetic compatibility 
(EMC) and road testing and develop a drawing package.  At the end of phase one, the 
MOTS will be fully developed and qualified.  
 
 
Figure 12.   Mobile Tower System. 
 
The PIF also succeeded in landing the Tactical Terminal Control System (TTCS) 
task.  The TTCS is a highly-mobile air traffic facility, which is used at the Brigade-level 
to provide Air Traffic Services (ATS) at remote landing zones, drop-zones, and 
temporary helicopter operating areas.  It is capable of ground-to-air communications 
between Army, other Services, and allied aircraft.  It is also capable of ground-to-ground 
communications internal to ATS units and ATS units and other ground units.  The 
configuration allows some of the components of the TTCS to conform to man-pack 
configurations.  Figure 13 shows the TTCS.  Figure 14 depicts the TTCS communication 
suites.  The PIF TTCS task is a $1.2 million effort that will integrate ARC-220 radios and 
KY 100 and Fanlight antennas into the TTCS.  Radio menus and control software will be 
upgraded and an updated technical data package and technical manual will be provided.  
Three prototype systems will be installed and tested as a part of this task. 
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Figure 13.   Tactical Terminal Control System. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Tactical Terminal Control System Communications Suite. 
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The PIF has also succeeded in acquiring the Common Transponder Program 
(CXP).  The CXP replaces the AXP-100, currently in the OH-58, with the upgraded 
AXP-118.  The PIF is teamed with the JVYS, Lear Siglear, RTTC, and ATTC, in this 
one-year, $1.1 million program, to develop, prototype, validate, and verify the OH-58 
Control Display System Version 4 (CDS4) programs.   
The PIF is also performing embedded global positioning system, inertial 
navigation system (EGI) integration into the UH-60 and CH-47 aircraft.  The H-764G 
EGI program is a tri-service; United States Air Force-led effort to provide an integrated 
navigation solution for aircraft equipped with a MIL-STD 1553 digital data bus.  The 
EGI embeds a 5-channel GPS receiver into a ring laser gyro inertial navigation system, 
making the total system weight only 17.9 pounds.  The EGI will provide extremely 
precise location to the aircraft fire control computer or integrated system processor for 
processing targeting information/sensor pre-pointing.  The EGI is the objective, fully-
digitized GPS solution for scout/attack helicopters.  Figure 15 shows the H-764G EGI 
System.  The PIF is teamed with the JVYS, RTTC, ATTC, and ARINC on this $2.025 
million effort. 
While the PIF has succeeded in taking advantage of new opportunities to 
prototype aviation hardware, it has continued to support on-going programs, including 
the PATRIOT Battery Command Post (BCP) program.  The PATRIOT BCP is a 
replacement for the two and one-half ton M109 Van.  The design, fabrication, integration, 
and testing of Phase 1 prototypes is complete.  A total of 24 Phase 1 BCP’s will be 
integrated, with 14 already deployed.  Phase 1 development was initiated in FY03, with a 




Figure 15.   The H-764G EGI System. 
 
 
Figure 16.   PATRIOT Battery Command Post. 
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While the PIF concept has been successful in taking advantage of new 
opportunities, as evidenced by the rapid increase in aviation weapon system business, it 
has also embarked upon a path to provide program managers solutions to satisfy other, 
non-modification, types of requirements.  As an example, the PIF has submitted a 
proposal to the CH-47 program office to reduce recapitalization costs of the CH-47 fleet.  
The PIF proposal has identified fifty-one of the sixty-one recapped components as low-
risk candidates that lend themselves to ‘breakout’ procurement.  The PIF would manage 
the acquisition of these components, while utilizing the OEM for procurement of the 
other ten items.  Utilizing the PIF-proposed methodology would significantly reduce the 
engineering support costs proposed by the OEM.  Through the incorporation of a best-
value type of approach, the CH-47 program would achieve a twenty –five to forty percent 
reduction in overall recapitalization costs.  The OEM would still be utilized for 
management of ten of the sixty-one recapped items, as well as for engineering and data 
support for the fifty-one ‘breakout’ items. 
The PIF concept also presents program managers with the opportunity to prove 
out technology developments that may be critical to the affordability of their systems.  
For instance, the Comanche program manager is utilizing the PIF to manage the 
development of a composite transmission housing.  The composite transmission 
development effort is a key program component, aimed at reducing the overall weight of 
the Comanche system.  Through the PIF concept, the Comanche program manager is 
afforded the benefit of leveraging the efforts of several organizations, including the 
AMRDEC Engineering and Aviation Engineering Directorates, Comanche program 
office, and Sikorsky, to have them collectively-focused, and locally-managed to insure 
program office goals are achieved.  
H. CHALLENGES 
Many challenges were faced while crafting the PIF concept.  The most prominent 
was overcoming the cultural barriers that existed in all of the facets of the concept.  This 
has required an intense level of oversight by Engineering Directorate management 
personnel to insure that the necessary actions were taken to enable the PIF concept to 
emerge. 
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The most significant challenge involved the articulation of the PIF concept, its 
power, and its potential.  This proved to be very difficult, in that the new PIF concept was 
very innovative and creative in comparison to what had previously existed.  The 
uniqueness of the concept made it difficult to understand, much less accept.  The PIF 
concept required those involved to extend themselves beyond the level of comfort that 
they had enjoyed in their present positions and organizations.  The PIF concept was 
developed from a business perspective, which was the mutually-beneficial ability to 
resolve program manager’s increased prototyping needs, and to perform that work on a 
customer-reimbursable basis within the AMRDEC.  This also required that the way 
business was currently being done would be dramatically changed.  Under this concept, 
the PIF would have to operate more like a business and less like a Government 
organization.  This was not, and is still not, universally understood by most within the 
AMCOM community. 
One of the early challenges involved merging Prototype Engineering Division and 
EAP Lab personnel physically and functionally into one new fully-integrated 
organization.  These personnel were some of the first to be exposed to the new concept, 
and among the first who would be required to accept changes in their roles and 
responsibilities.  Since most of these personnel had established roles in their respective 
organizations, this was a particularly difficult change to accept.  In addition, the physical 
movement of these two groups of personnel highlighted the distinctly differing cultures 
that had existed prior to the merger.  Prototype Engineering Division personnel were 
accustomed to a more relaxed environment, where business growth was naturally 
achieved through repeat business from existing customers or word-of-mouth.  Very little 
thought had been put into developing a business strategy that either took advantage of 
new opportunities or developed innovative capabilities.  The EAP Lab personnel, on the 
other hand, had existed in a culture where business growth was encouraged and expected.  
New business development was included in EAP Lab personnel performance objectives.  
The ability of EAP Lab personnel to develop new business was, therefore, a key 
component of their annual performance rating.  These vastly differing cultures created an 
initial environment of distrust and uncertainty, especially as personnel from both 
organizations clamored for positions in the new functionally-integrated organization.  
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The development of the initial functional operating organizational structure was left to 
senior personnel from the two organizations as an attempt to achieve some level of buy-in 
from the personnel who would be most affected.  This process, however, became lengthy 
and emotions ran high on both sides, which ultimately inhibited the integration process.  
The resulting functional structure, while logically-based, has not achieved the level of 
acceptance needed to reach efficiency in operation, and has not been utilized as intended.  
One positive event that eased a portion of the tension between the two groups of 
personnel, was the dedication of the Larry O. Daniel PIF in July 2002.  This was an 
extremely significant event, both in terms of the magnitude of the effort required and the 
level of the dignitaries that attended.  All involved personnel worked extremely hard and 
were collectively responsible for the success of the dedication and the image presented to 
the key dignitaries that included, the Secretary of the Army, the Commanding General, 
AMC, and one Senator from the state of Alabama.  The AMCOM Commanding General, 
on two separate occasions, recognized each person involved in this ceremony.  This 
action, more than any other, has validated for many of the personnel involved, the 
magnitude of the opportunity presented by the PIF concept, and has served to partially 
mitigate the feelings of distrust remaining between the two groups of personnel. 
The PIF concept proved difficult to communicate to industry as well.  Since the 
ability of the PIF to partner with many levels of industry was a key component of the PIF 
concept, much effort was expended in this area.  The ability to achieve approval from 
industry depended upon the ability of PIF management personnel make the mutually-
beneficial business case.  This was accomplished through efforts on two fronts.  The first 
involved the acceptance of the PIF concept by the weapon system program manager 
community.  Once the program managers were convinced that the concept would provide 
an affordable alternative for them to acquire materiel, industry became attentive and 
willing to discuss the details of the PIF concept.  There existed, however, a certain level 
of reluctance, even at this point, due to the proposed industrial structure.  The proposed 
structure utilized a joint venture of Yulista Management Services Inc. and Science & 
Engineering Services (SES) Inc. (JVYS) as the prime contractor, and proposed that other 
industry partners including OEM’s, capability-specific companies, and applicable small 
businesses, function as subcontractors to the JVYS.  While this structure was met with 
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some skepticism, it proved not to be a major barrier, but nonetheless, required a 
significant effort from PIF management personnel to resolve.  The biggest hurdle was 
that associated with the teaming aspect of the structure.  Culturally, the partnering 
concept was foreign to most of the required participants, including many of the OEM’s 
and capability-specific companies.  The small business community was actually better 
versed in this strategy and was much quicker to accept the structure.  Two key aspects of 
the PIF concept helped to mitigate the concerns of the larger companies.  The first was 
that the OEM’s became convinced that the PIF was not structured to compete, per se, 
with their major business interests.  While there might be instances where the PIF would 
compete for certain program manager requirements, in most cases OEM strategic plans 
did not involve the type of the work to be performed by the PIF.  In fact, many of the 
OEM’s frankly pointed out that they were not even interested in many of the types of 
tasks that the PIF was seeking, to the point, where they were even becoming a detriment 
to meeting program manager needs because of conflicting company priorities.  The 
second aspect of the PIF concept, that garnered the attention of the larger companies, was 
the magnitude of the contract that was being put into place.  When industry became 
aware that a ten-year, $1.1 billion contract was imminent, much of the initial reluctance 
surrounding the partnering structure evaporated.  Industry was quite aware of the 
business opportunities that existed and the likelihood that they could compete for a 
significant share of that business. 
The development of the PIF RAP contract was also a tremendous challenge that 
posed momentous barriers and required extraordinary measures to overcome.  From the 
outset, it was recognized that the PIF contract mechanism would be an essential part of 
the PIF concept.  Personnel from the PIF, along with AMCOM working-level acquisition 
center and legal personnel, analyzed the PIF vision and its requirements and crafted a 
contract mechanism to fit the requirement.  The result was a unique contracting 
mechanism that enabled partnering with all levels of industry, and did so at reduced 
overhead rates and creative material dollar allocations.  Because of the unique features 
and sheer size and length of the contract, this ten-year, $1.1 billion contract was subjected 
to an extraordinary level of scrutiny from the acquisition community.  The bottom-line 
issue centered on their lack of understanding of the PIF concept, which led to this 
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scrutiny, that was eventually overcome after many discussions and meetings with 
acquisition center personnel. 
Several key challenges remain that must be overcome in order for the PIF concept 
to be effectively and efficiently implemented.  The foremost is the cultural challenge that 
continues to provide barriers to effective execution.  These cultural challenges are evident 
in many areas, including both the personnel and organizational areas.  The most notable 
cultural challenge, however, still evolves around a Government-owned, Government-
operated facility partnering with industry and other Government organizations in a 
business-type of environment.  The conservative nature of many of the functional support 
organizations at AMCOM will continue to present challenges to the PIF concept. 
One other significant challenge exists for the PIF concept.  That challenge 
involves the integration of the PIF concept into the newly-formed AMC, Research, 
Development, and Engineering (RDE) Command.  The AMC RDE Command was 
formed to fully exploit the enormous potential that resides in research activities around 
the world.  This new RDE Command was formed to respond by rapidly integrating, 
maturing, and demonstrating all emerging technologies to field the right equipment, in 
the shortest time, for our soldiers.  The proposed RDE Command -organization is shown 
at Figure 17 (Reference 9.) 
48 
 
Figure 17.   Research, Development and Engineering Command (Proposed). 
 
The mission of RDE Command is to field technologies which will sustain 
America’s Army as the premier land force in the world, and to be recognized as the 
preeminent world leader in research, development, and engineering of systems-of-
systems whose hallmark is transitioning the right technology in the shortest time to our 
soldiers.  The RDE Command has three primary objectives; to integrate Research, 
Development, and Engineering across all areas of the Army, the other Services, 
universities, and all other sources; to get the products of technology to the soldier faster; 
and to demonstrate the agility to rapidly take advantage of opportunities no matter where 
they may arise.  The RDE Command states that the achievement of these objectives will 
require new and innovative approaches to all aspects of the development of technology 
for the soldier, and that the Commander of the RDE Command is empowered to 
experiment and test new ideas and processes (Reference 9.).  One of the key facets of the 
RDE Command is the “Skunkworks” or Agile Development Center.  The PIF 
management has proposed to the RDE Command Commanding General, to utilize the 
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PIF model as the means for the development of this capability.  Figure 18 depicts the 
proposed structure that was briefed to RDE Command personnel (Reference 10.). 
 
Figure 18.   Proposed Research, Development, and Engineering Command Agile 
Development Organization. 
 
Utilization of the PIF concept is the model of how the AMC RDE Command 
Agile Development Capability could leverage other Army prototyping capabilities and 
industrial resources and serve as the mechanism for the RDE Command to fulfill its 
objective to rapidly provide materiel to the soldiers in the field. 
I. SUMMARY 
The PIF concept is comprised of many facets, each of which plays an important 
role in its success.  The interaction of the business strategy, organizational structure, 
facility, capabilities, and contract structure, laid upon the foundation of the internal 
prototyping experience that has existed at AMCOM for the last twenty-five years, has 
proven itself to be a worthy endeavor, valuable to both missile and aviation program 
managers.  This is based upon the increased level of PIF business since the activation and 
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integration of these key elements.  The PIF concept has the opportunity to play an even 
more significant role for the Army as future processes are considered to move Army- 
developed materiel into the hands of the warfighters in a more efficient manner. 
51 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has provided a case study of how a unique prototyping strategy was 
developed to support aviation and missile program managers.  It has described the 
environment that existed at AMCOM, with both the prototyping community and the 
variables surrounding aviation and missile program managers with respect to their 
constant challenge to field materiel to the soldiers in a timely, cost effective manner.  
This thesis has provided a detailed analysis of the PIF concept, including the major 
elements that comprise this concept and the challenges that were overcome to implement 
it.   
There are three major conclusions to draw from this case study.  The first is to 
provide a constant awareness of the environment that exists, for both program managers 
and within supporting functional organizational capabilities, to be able to explore every 
opportunity to aid program managers by providing value-added capabilities to meet their 
needs and the needs of the warfighters.  It is no secret that the global environment has 
changed dramatically since the World Trade Center terrorist attacks.  It is also evident 
that the DoD environment, from where wars are fought, to how we fight wars, to what we 
fight with, is undergoing unprecedented transformation as a result.  The Army acquisition 
community must be cognizant that these changes will continue to provide opportunities to 
assist program managers.  The key to taking advantage of these opportunities will be the 
ability of the Army acquisition community to challenge both the culture and the 
traditional ways of doing business that currently exist within the Army.  If the unique 
challenges that face the program manager of today and tomorrow are to be resolved, they 
will require creative solutions.  The PIF concept is but one example of how an existing 
capability was retooled to provide a needed capability to program managers who are 
faced with the pressures of providing materiel to the soldiers in the field as expeditiously 
as possible.  
The second major conclusion that can be derived from this case study is that it is 
incumbent upon Government functional personnel in positions of authority, to look to 
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other entities, both Governmental and industrial, to leverage their capabilities as a means 
to provide cost effective products to program managers, and to strengthen the Army 
infrastructure.  What this really means is that the Government must begin to operate more 
like a business, and less like the stove-piped bureaucracy that it has been.  This will 
require functional Government managers to perform initial and ongoing strategic 
assessments of Governmental and industrial capabilities to assess those that can be 
integrated to form value-added services for program managers.  The development of 
business processes and the identification of resources, to include funding, personnel, and 
equipment, will then be required to support this integration effort.  The program manager, 
and his needs, must also be considered as the key variable during this entire process in 
order for success to be achieved.  The PIF concept is an example of how partnering and 
the utilization of various organizational capabilities can be of tremendous benefit to 
program managers.  The mixture of Governmental and industrial capabilities that exist 
within the PIF concept, have given aviation and missile program managers an 
opportunity to cost effectively procure materiel.  The internal and external expertise 
brought to the program manager through the PIF concept, is a key cost reduction variable 
that supports this model.  And, the incorporation of the program manager into the 
development of the PIF concept, achieved the buy-in needed from the customer to 
validate the benefits of the concept.   
Embarking on this kind of path, however, presents a significant challenge and 
requires an enormous amount of perseverance to achieve.  Once again, leveraging and 
strategic partnering, force Government personnel, especially those in positions of 
authority, to think and act in a manner that challenges their “comfortable” mode of 
operation that had existed for many years.  Breaking this cultural barrier is extremely 
difficult to achieve.  Assuming this huge barrier can be overcome, the ability to then 
assimilate the resources and processed required to operate more like a business, present 
even greater challenges to the success of a concept of this nature.  This requires effective 
communication both up and down the chain of command, to facilitate concept 
implementation.  Because of the culture that exists within the Government, succeeding in 
an endeavor, such as the development of the PIF concept, is frequently stalled at higher 
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organizational levels.  This often requires a great deal of political acumen and delicate 
maneuvering to overcome, which is no small task. 
The third major conclusion is that the development of the PIF concept has proved 
to be initially successful, but requires significant attention to sustain the success it has 
experienced so far, and to achieve the requisite level of value to program managers.  The 
influx of $18 million of new business to the PIF from March to October 2002, has 
validated the concept that was envisioned two years earlier, one that has taken advantage 
of the evolving environment and the challenges experienced by program managers.  The 
AMRDEC has positioned itself to take advantage of these variables and has provided a 
much-needed service to program managers.  The PIF, as successful as it has been 
initially, requires a significant level of continuing attention to insure the continuation of 
its success and to more effectively operate and compete for future business.  
Organizational, personnel, and facility challenges exist that must be proactively 
addressed in order for the PIF to sustain itself over the next ten-to-fifteen years.  
Replacing the “job shop” mentality that currently exists, with one of a business mentality, 
is a massive barrier that must be overcome in the next two years.  Once a business 
mentality is achieved, it will then become necessary to identify, develop, and implement 
the business processes and tools necessary to allow for the sustainment and growth of the 
PIF. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The development of the PIF concept has been a unique and challenging task that 
has provided valuable learning opportunities for the future.  The following are the 
primary recommendations resulting from this case study.  These recommendations 
encompass those associated specifically with the PIF as it exists today, and those that 
relate to broader issues experienced during the development of the PIF concept. 
1. PIF Organization 
Engineering Directorate management should formalize the PIF organization.  This 
will require that current personnel, belonging organizationally to the Prototype 
Engineering Division and the EAP Lab of the Manufacturing, Science, and Technology 
Division, be formed officially into one organizational structure, renamed the Prototype 
Integration Division (PID).  The PID would consist of a GS-15-level division chief 
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reporting directly to the Deputy Director, Engineering Directorate.  The PID would be 
structured to better facilitate the vision and objectives of the PIF, and would include both 
a technical and a business deputy, as a means to manage the significant growth in 
program manager business.  The business deputy would provide the necessary attention 
to all business aspects of the PIF, which is a critical need for the success of the PIF to 
occur.  Various GS-14-level team leader positions should also be established to acquire 
the necessary personnel expertise to support the PIF.  This too, is a critical need that 
exists, and one that must be resolved before the PIF can more efficiently operate.  All of 
these actions will require both significant interaction with the Civilian Personnel Activity 
Center (CPAC) and union approval to be successfully implemented.  Once accomplished, 
PID personnel should embark on a series of team-building exercises to facilitate the 
elimination of previously-existing cultural barriers.   
2. PIF Business Process Development 
Engineering Directorate management, in conjunction with PIF personnel, should 
develop the business processes necessary to evolve the business infrastructure that is 
required for the PIF to sustain its growth potential.  The development of an integrated 
data environment (IDE) is the most immediate tool that needs to be developed.  
Integrated data environment is a collaborative infrastructure embodying data standards 
that support business processes across geographically-dispersed locations and 
heterogeneous organizations.  The IDE should be supported by an information 
infrastructure consisting of the hardware, software, and communications network 
resources required to store and transfer the data.  In addition to information sharing, an 
IDE should allow for better configuration management and work process control.  An 
Earned Value Management System (EVMS) should also be included as a part of the IDE 
tool development process.  The development of an IDE tool is crucial to the future 
success of the PIF. 
3. Establishment of a PIF Board of Directors 
Engineering Directorate management and PIF personnel should establish a PIF 
board of directors (BOD) comprised of the Deputy PEO Tactical Missiles, Deputy PEO 
Air and Missile Defense, Deputy PEO Aviation, Associate Director for Aviation and 
Missile Systems, AMRDEC, and Director, Engineering Directorate.  The primary 
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purpose of the PIF BOD would be to insure that the PIF is operating in such a manner as 
to provide effective and efficient support to program managers.  The PIF BOD would 
also act as an enabler for the PIF to achieve developed strategic goals. 
4. AMC RDE Command Agile Development Capability 
Engineering Directorate management and PIF personnel should develop a 
strategic plan for PIF involvement in the development of the AMC RDE Command Agile 
Development capability.  This plan, as a minimum, should propose Engineering 
Directorate management involvement in the development of this AMC RDE Command 
capability.  It also should suggest the use of the PIF concept as a model for how this 
AMC RDE Command Agile Development capability should be developed. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
• What are the primary tenants of the unique prototyping strategy developed 
at AMCOM and what benefits will it provide to aviation and missile 
weapon systems? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• What business and capability impacts does the AMRDEC prototyping 
strategy have on the AMRDEC as a whole? 
Implementation of the PIF concept will have significant business and capability 
impacts on the AMRDEC as a whole.  The PIF concept requires the use of the most cost 
effective expertise available, from both industrial and/or Governmental organizations.  
One of the key thrusts of the PIF concept is to use, to the extent possible, capabilities that 
exist within the AMRDEC.  The AMRDEC is comprised of both an aviation and missile 
technical expertise, much of which does not otherwise exist.  In addition, the use of 
AMRDEC expertise is often incurred at a reduced cost, given that the PIF is only charged 
for that specific portion of the time that an AMRDEC technical expert is utilized for a 
specific task.  The PIF concept also has the potential to eliminate duplicative capabilities.  
Several organizations exist within the AMRDEC that possess limited prototyping and 
machining capabilities that duplicate those that already exist in the PIF.  Likewise, many 
other AMRDEC organizations, through contractual means, have the capability to access 
other technical areas of expertise that are organic to the AMRDEC.  The PIF concept 
would eliminate a large portion of the duplication that currently exists.  The initial 
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implementation of the PIF concept has already seen the integration of capabilities from 
several AMRDEC organizations to support PIF tasks.  The Software Engineering 
Directorate, Missile Guidance Directorate, System Simulation and Analysis Directorate, 
Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, and the Aviation Engineering Directorate have 
all provided technical expertise to support aviation and missile prototyping tasks.  The 
PIF, through the continued institutionalization of this thrust, will strengthen the 
AMRDEC from both a capability and business perspective. 
• What impact does the AMRDEC prototyping strategy have on other 
AMCOM and AMCOM tenant organizations? 
The PIF concept also has the potential to have an extensive positive impact on 
other AMCOM and AMCOM tenant organizations.  Through the PIF conceptual strategy 
to include cost effective expertise to support PIF tasks, other AMCOM and AMCOM 
tenant organizations have the opportunity to provide their expertise.  The PIF already has 
made extensive use of RTTC, and ATTC capabilities, personnel, and facilities during the 
performance of several aviation and missile prototyping tasks.  The use of the test 
capabilities of these organizations verses the internal PIF development of these 
capabilities, is a prime example of the cost and capability trade-offs that the PIF has made 
to reduce costs.  In addition, the PIF has formed strategic partnering relationships with 
both of these organizations to provide the test capabilities required for PIF aviation and 
missile prototyping tasks.  The PIF has also utilized acquisition center personnel to award 
the PIF RAP contract.  Through the increase in business, opportunities will provide for an 
increased level of support from this organization.  It is envisioned that on-site, full-time 
requirements for acquisition personnel will emerge in the near future.  The use of 
acquisition center personnel in a cost-reimbursable role will drastically challenge the 
operational process that currently exists in the acquisition center.  The PIF also has 
opportunities to partner with NASA, particularly in the rapid, virtual prototyping, and 
materials areas.  The PIF has initiated discussions with NASA personnel on both of these 
fronts.    
• What is the relationship that exists with industry as a result of 
implementation of the AMRDEC prototyping strategy? 
The PIF relationship with industry, since the implementation of the PIF concept in 
June 2002, has been very positive, despite the unique, and often misunderstood, 
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contractual mechanism that is in place.  The PIF RAP contract, a ten-year, $1.1 billion 
instrument, provided for the inclusion of all levels of industrial participation including 
that of the OEM, capability-specific companies, service companies, and small businesses, 
through subcontractor arrangements with the JVYS, the prime contractor.  The initial 
response from industry, when the PIF RAP contract was being formulated was, however, 
lukewarm at best.  Many OEMs saw the PIF as a threat to their business base.  Many of 
the other companies, both large and small, felt that there would be little opportunity for 
their participation.  Once the PIF RAP contract was awarded and industry became 
educated in the mission of the PIF and the PIF RAP contract, an enormous amount of 
interest occurred from all levels of industry.  Industry has been very supportive since the 
implementation of the PIF concept.  In a four-month period, approximately $18 million 
has been awarded to several companies, at all levels.  Many of the PIF industrial partners 
understand that, while they may not receive all taskings and associated funding for 
contracted prototyping efforts, they will benefit from the sheer magnitude of the PIF 
business. 
• What cultural barriers were encountered during the implementation of the 
AMRDEC prototyping strategy and how were they overcome? 
Their were, and still remain, many cultural challenges associated with the PIF 
concept implementation, the most significant of which remains the lack of understanding 
of the concept, due to its many facets, each comprised of their own distinct cultural 
challenges.  Since the PIF concept is built upon a business foundation, it has, and will 
continue to be, a difficult concept to comprehend, since most Government organizations 
are deeply rooted in their traditional, bureaucratic environments.  For instance, strategic 
partnering and leveraging of existing capabilities from other Governmental and industrial 
organizations is not an accepted philosophy at AMCOM, and has posed a tremendous 
challenge.  The most effective means of mitigating this type of cultural resistance is to 
persevere to the point where initial positive results can be achieved.  Success is the most 
effective means of changing culture.  The initial successes of the PIF, since 
implementation of the entire concept, have served to change the culture associated with 
the traditional means of doing business.  Other associated cultural challenges have and 
will continue to exist.  Acceptance of the organizational structure of the PIF concept by 
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the workforce has been one such cultural inhibitor.  The integration of two separate 
groups of personnel from two different organizations with distinctly differing cultures has 
required a vast amount of attention.  Acceptance has been slow, but again, the successes 
achieved and the intense oversight from Engineering Directorate management, have 
overcome a portion of this cultural barrier.   
• How does the AMRDEC prototyping strategy fit within the new Research, 
Development, and Engineering Command? 
It remains to be seen what role the PIF concept might have within the AMC’s 
RDE Command Agile Development capability, but there is tremendous opportunity for 
an exceptional fit.  The PIF conceptual model is very appropriate to the charter of this 
AMC capability.  The implementation of the AMC RDE Command Agile Development 
capability faces the same challenges as those faced by the PIF.  These include 
infrastructure issues such as facilities and contact mechanisms, and more significantly, 
cultural issues, such as the acceptance of strategic partnering and leveraging of 
capabilities that exist throughout AMC and its industrial base.  All of these issues must be 
addressed in order for this capability to support the mission of the AMC RDE Command 
to get technology to the warfighter more efficiently.  The PIF concept and Engineering 
Directorate personnel expertise in this area, could serve AMC well as they continue to 
develop the Agile Development capability. 
D. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
• How could the PIF concept maximize technology development and 
demonstration efforts to provide program managers objective assessment 
of technologies for potential weapon system insertion? 
• How could the PIF concept partner with academia to develop technology 
and entry-level personnel with hard-to-find skills such as aerospace 
engineering, and software engineering? 
• How could the PIF concept incorporate the capabilities within the AMC 
RDE Command more effectively? 
• How could the PIF concept incorporate the capabilities of the Air Force, 
and the Navy? 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AACE  Army Aviation Corridor of Excellence 
AED  Aviation Engineering Directorate 
AH  Attack Helicopter 
AMC  Army Materiel Command 
AMCOM Aviation and Missile Command 
AMRDEC Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center 
AMD Air and Missile Defense 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
ARC Airborne Radio Communications 
ATS Air Traffic Services 
ATTC Aviation Technical Test Center 
AWR Air Worthiness Release 
 
 
BCP Battery Command Post 
BGA Ball Grid Array 
BOD Board of Directors 
 
 
CAD/CAM Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing 
CARC Chemical Agent Resistant Coating 
CH Cargo Helicopter 
COR Contracting Officers Representative 
COTS/NDI Commercial Off The Shelf/Non-Developmental Item 
CPFF Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
CTR Continuous Technology Refreshment 
CXP Common Transponder 
 
 




EAP Engineering and Analysis Prototype 
EGI Embedded Global Positioning System, Inertial Navigation System 
EIA Electronic Industry Association 
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
ESAM Electronic, Simulation and Analysis Modeling 
ESD Electrostatic Discharge 
 
 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
 
 
GFE/GFP Government Furnished Equipment/Government Furnished 
Property 
GOGO Government Owned, Government Operated 
 
 
HMMWV High Mobility, Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 
 
 
IDE Integrated Data Environment 
IPC International Packaging Consortium 
IMMC Integrated Materiel Management Center 
 
 
JVYS Joint Venture, Yulista, Science and Engineering Services, Inc. 
 
 
MOTS Mobile Tower System 
MWO Modification Work Order 
 
 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
 
 
ODC Other Direct Costs 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 




PCO Procurement Contracting Officer 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PID Prototype Integration Division 
PIF Prototype Integration Facility 
PM Program Manager 
 
 
RAP Rapid Acquisition Prototyping 
R&D Research and Development 
RDE Research, Development, Engineering 
ROM Rough Order Magnitude 
RTTC Redstone Technical Test Center 
 
 
SESI Science and Engineering Services, Inc. 
SOW Statement of Work 
STC Supplemental Type Certificate 
 
 
T&M Time and Material 
TDEP Technical Directive Execution Plan 
TDP Technical Data Package 
TM Tactical Missile 
TTCS Tactical Terminal Communication System 
 
 
UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle 
UH Utility-Helicopter 
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